Russia and Ukraine Are Talking a Peace Deal. But What Red Lines Might Prevent It From Happening?
The Financial Times reported yesterday, based on information from five knowledgeable sources, that Russian and Ukrainian representatives are nearer to a peace deal than they have been at any point in the three-week war. A 15-point draft plan is now being discussed, and both sides are expressing a bit of optimism even while acknowledging that big difficulties lie ahead.
What might be the components of any peace accord, if one is reached by the parties? Let’s unpack what each side is demanding and where their “red lines” lie, the ones that might ultimately prevent a negotiated settlement.
Ukraine and NATO
One of Putin’s stated objectives is the “demilitarization” of the country of Ukraine, which includes his “red line” that Ukraine may never join NATO. The eastward expansion of NATO has been a thorn in Putin’s side since the end of the Cold War, and he seems unable to stomach the idea of Ukraine ever joining a defensive pact against Mother Russia.
Ukraine’s aspiration for NATO membership was once so strong that it was written into its Constitution. Now, the invasion only seems to have underscored the risk that non-NATO countries bordering Russia face. Indeed, since the invasion, support for NATO membership within neutral nations such as Sweden and Finland increased sharply, and the leaders of both countries have held high-level talks with the U.S. and its allies around issues of defense.
President Zelenskyy seems to understand that no peace will be achievable so long as NATO membership is still on the table. But to give that option up would appear to capitulate on the question of self-governance and self-determination in the face of naked aggression and violence. So how does Ukraine edge away from NATO membership without handing a victory to Putin, who would wind up getting his way?
On this matter, Zelenskyy has shown he is quite strategic and adept at diplomacy. He already has pointed out that Ukraine’s bid to join NATO was denied by the bloc, and that he is now satisfied that Ukraine “must admit” that it is simply not going to happen. This deftly puts the blame largely on NATO, not Russia, for Ukraine being left out of the treaty. In other words, even if Russia had not invaded, Zelenskyy implies, Ukraine still wouldn’t be and likely never would be in NATO. Ukrainians, he says, must be “adequate” to their own defense, in the way that Sweden and Finland are.
Some commentators have observed that Zelenskyy took strategic diplomacy to an even more elevated level by demanding something he knew NATO could never do: a no-fly zone over his country in the middle of a hot war with Russia. By repeatedly shaming NATO over its failure to close the skies, leading to added misery and death for the Ukrainian people, Zelenskyy was then free to muse aloud that if NATO behaved like this, maybe it wasn’t worth joining. He now has a path to accede to Russia’s demand by claiming it was Ukraine’s decision to forego NATO aspiration.
Ceasefire and the Withdrawal of Russian Troops
Any peace agreement would have as its starting point both a ceasefire and an agreed-upon withdrawal of Russian troops from most of Ukraine. But the timetable for this would matter a great deal. It is early spring in Ukraine, which means one thing for military planners: mud. Throughout April, the off-road countryside will be wet and will form natural traps for Russian forces hesitant to advance upon better-defended roads where they are more vulnerable and out in the open. If Russia can manage to delay any withdrawal until the warmer month of May, its forces could avoid the fearsome “General Mud” who has historically served Russia but is about to present huge problems for its invasion of Ukraine. By late spring though, Russia could find itself in a better strategic position as the earth hardens and becomes more hospitable for its heavy military vehicles. Ukrainian negotiators understand this, which is why an agreement must be reached soon or the situation on the ground could shift considerably.
Moreover, while a temporary ceasefire might sound appealing in the abstract, so long as Russian soldiers continue to occupy large swaths of the country, any lull in hostilities only gives Russia time to rearm and reload, as grand chess master Garry Kasparov, a longtime critic of Putin, observed. The chief problems faced by Russian ground forces include a lack of supplies (food, fuel and ammunition) and low morale. Some U.S. military experts have even suggested that Russia only has about a week left before it runs out of critical supplies. A lull in hostilities, therefore, could give the Russian military precious time to regroup, reinforce and regain their spirit. On the other side, however, Ukrainian population centers are suffering daily, and each day the war extends brings added misery and death.
Under these circumstances, any ceasefire agreement cannot simply freeze the status quo but would need to secure a retreat of forces from Russia. Whether Putin is able to swallow his pride and retreat remains unclear. He likely will need to be able to claim some kind of achievement, even in retreat, so as not to appear defeated and lose his grip on power at home. And that’s where the greatest obstacles to peace likely lie.
Occupied Territories and Security Guarantees
The biggest obstacles to any accord will be the status of Ukrainian lands now held by Russia in the east as well as the Crimea region, which Russia invaded and annexed in 2014. Given Putin’s stated goal of reuniting the Russian-speaking populaces in these regions with their motherland, it seems unlikely that he would agree to give up any of those lands as part of a peace deal. This would present Ukrainian negotiators with a hard choice: surrender territory illegally seized by a warring neighbor (and by that very action reward violent, illegal behavior) or continue to fight a devastating war with no true end in sight.
Without NATO membership, the future of Ukrainian security also would lie very much in doubt. Russia has already shown a harsh willingness to invade a neighboring nation to achieve what it wants, without regard for human suffering and civilian deaths. At the same time, it is unlikely to allow Western military bases, cooperative defense agreements, or other strategic toe-holds by the West within Ukraine.
For its part, Ukraine cannot simply trust the word of Russia that it will honor the borders of the country. Russia has already shown it is not to be trusted on agreements; after all, Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons back to Russia at the end of the Cold War in exchange for border integrity guarantees that Russia has now violated twice, once in Crimea in 2014 and again in its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s word is as worthless as its currency today.
But an uneasy peace with only paper guarantees may be all that the parties can muster at this time, with Russia sent to lick its wounds and suffer the long-term financial and political consequences of its actions while Ukraine begins the long and painful path of trying to rebuild what was destroyed. Perhaps the only thing that will keep the peace is a desire on both sides never to see anything like this happen again.
This has some historical precedent. When Stalin invaded Finland in 1939 in what became known as the “Winter War,” it touched off a native resistance that was highly costly to the Soviet Union and of course to the Finns. But just three months later, it ended in a treaty after Stalin failed to achieve his goals despite massive initial military superiority. Finland, like Ukraine today, showed the invading Soviet forces that the price to destroy another country can prove very, very high. In the final accord, Stalin did annex some territory of Finland—around nine percent of the country—but few can say that the Soviet Union came out ahead for its actions. Today, Finland is a thriving democracy that is heavily armed and ready to defend itself against a repeat of that Russian invasion.
Still, today in Ukraine we are a ways from a negotiated peace, and Putin has shown little appetite to tone down his own rhetoric and deescalate the situation. He may only ever agree to a settlement if he is forced to it through prolonged defeats at the hands of the staunch Ukrainian resistance. And because Putin tends to respond to losses by upping the stakes and his threats, it is very possible that things will get far worse before they have a hope of getting any better.
We are seeing the deadly cost of never holding a tyrant accountable, until it's almost too late. This has all been horrifying. We here in the States, better learn this lesson while there's still time. Practically the entire Republican party, under the "leadership" of trump, not so secretly, want to be able to control us the way Putin controls his population. We too, are running out of time. May everyone's better angels prevail.
Putin has lost. He may take Ukraine, but he will never leave Russia again, and the sanctions against Russia will be in place until he is deposed. He is a mass murderer, and has ruined his nation. What needs to happen now is a forensic accounting of the money trails from Putin to his supporters in the United States and elsewhere.